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We experimentally study the impact of public opinion poll releases on voter turnout and 
welfare in a participation game. We find higher turnout rates when polls inform the electorate 
about the levels of support for various candidates than when polls are prohibited. 
Distinguishing between allied and floating voters, our data show that this increase in turnout 
is entirely due to floating voters. Very high turnout is observed when polls indicate equal 
support levels for the candidates. This has negative consequences for welfare. Though in 
aggregate social welfare is hardly affected, majorities benefit more often from polls than 
minorities. Finally, our comparative static results are better predicted by quantal response 
(logit) equilibrium than by Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
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In many countries public opinion polls provide the electorate with information about voter 
preferences in upcoming elections. In contrast, about equally many countries prohibit the re-
lease of such information in a given period prior to Election Day.
1 Neither policy can claim a 
clear foundation in scientific research: “After at least 60 years of research, a rich literature 
has developed concerning the question ‘do polls influence behavior?’. Yet no conclusive or 
unambiguous answer to the question can be given, whether related to vote choice, turnout, or 
opinions on issues” (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2000, p. 22). Consequently, policy makers 
cannot adequately evaluate the effects of public opinion poll releases on social welfare. 
  This paper uses game theory and laboratory experiments in an attempt to overcome this 
gap in our knowledge. In two-candidate majoritarian elections with costly turnout we 
compare electorates where the voters’ idiosyncratic preferences are kept secret to electorates 
where these are revealed before elections. In the latter case, a poll provides perfectly accurate 
information about the level of support for each candidate.
2 These levels of support determine 
the ‘level of disagreement’ in the electorate. Disagreement is high if both candidates receive 
similar levels of support and low if most voters prefer the same candidate (Feddersen and 
Sandroni 2006).
3 In analyzing the effects of polls we need to take the actual level of 
disagreement into account because the effect of information may depend on it. 
  For any given level of disagreement the release of polls may make (some) voters change 
their turnout decision. This has two potential welfare effects. First, changes in turnout have a 
direct influence because they change the electorate’s aggregate costs of voting. For example, 
higher turnout decreases welfare because it yields increased aggregate voting costs (Palfrey 
and Rosenthal 1983; Ledyard 1984). Second, welfare may be affected by changes in turnout 
because the candidates’ probabilities of winning may change. Here, we assume that the 
electorate’s aggregate benefits are larger if the candidate preferred by a majority of voters 
wins.
4 For example, if higher turnout (e.g., induced by a poll release) increases the majority-
                                                 
1 For 2002, a survey of 66 countries shows that 36 have no embargo on poll releases and 30 ban publication in a 
period ranging from a day to a month before elections (Foundation for Information/ESOMAR/WAPOR 2003). 
2 We provide perfect information to avoid unnecessary noise in our experiment. In practice, so-called ‘trial-heat 
polls’ become increasingly more informative about the election outcome (and thereby reduce such noise) in the 
course of a campaign (Erikson and Wlezien 1996; Brown and Chappell 1999; Campbell 1996). 
3 For example, there is currently high disagreement within the U.S. electorate, which has become increasingly 
polarized over the past three decades (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), culminating in astonishingly close 
presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. In contrast, the alleged low disagreement within the Polish electorate 
was confirmed when 77.5% voted ‘yes’ to the country’s entry to the EU in 2003. 
4 This assumption holds, for example, if each voter’s benefits from her or his preferred candidate winning is the 
same (and the same holds for losing). In that case, aggregate benefits are highest if the candidate supported by a 
majority wins. Since the aggregation of individual well-being is beyond the scope of our paper, we only 
  1preferred candidate’s chances, this increases welfare. Of course, whether changes in turnout 
have a positive or negative effect on the majority’s chances depends on how polls change the 
decisions to vote. If the influence of polls on these decisions is independent of voter’s 
preferences, turnout affects the majority’s chances (thus, the electorate’s aggregate benefits) 
positively. However, such independence is not obvious. If polls change the relative turnout 
between two supporter groups in favor of the minority, the majority’s chances may 
decrease.
5 Whether the release of public opinion polls ultimately increases or decreases 
welfare as a combined result of changes in aggregate voting costs and benefits is an 
important theoretical and empirical question. Our model and laboratory control allow us to 
answer this question by systematically examining and separating the various effects of polls 
greement is 
difficult to estimate in the field, whereas it is precisely known in the laboratory. 
                                                                                                                                                      
on turnout and welfare. 
  An important way in which polls may effect the decision to vote is through the 
information they convey about the ‘closeness’ of an election. In the rational choice model of 
Downs (1957), for example, this information may change a voter’s expectation of her or his 
vote being pivotal, where the pivot probability increases with the level of disagreement in the 
electorate. The Downsian voter will vote if the expected benefits exceed the voting costs. A 
change in perception of the level of disagreement (thus, the pivot probability) induced by 
polls changes expected benefits and, hence, may affect turnout in these models (e.g., Brown 
and Zech 1973; Zech 1975; and Gärtner 1976). Field studies have supported this relationship 
(that turnout increases in fierce races) by considering the ‘ex post’ closeness of elections 
−i.e., closeness based on actual votes cast− as a proxy for the level of disagreement (e.g., 
Matsusaka and Palda 1993). In contrast, our experiment allows us to control for the true ‘ex 
ante’ level of disagreement in the electorate −i.e., closeness based on the electorate’s 
preferences− to examine this relationship. Note that the ex ante level of disa
 
consider this case. For examples where benefits vary across voters and welfare may not be higher if the 
majority-preferred candidate wins see Campbell (1999); or Großer and Giertz (2006). 
5 For example, polls that indicate a lower level of disagreement than anticipated may stimulate turnout in the 
minority more than in the majority, where free rider incentives are stronger (cf. also Goeree and Großer 2007; 
Taylor and Yildirim 2006). In this way changes in voter turnout may negatively affect the majority-preferred 
candidate’s chances and thereby decrease welfare. Lohmann (1994) shows that negative welfare effects may 
also result from biased aggregate information through costly pre-election political action. In Börgers (2004), the 
electorate’s preferences are revealed ’ex post’ through compulsory voting (which maximizes the benefits). 
However, welfare decreases as compared to voluntary voting because of the excessive turnout costs. Krasa and 
Polborn (2006) use the model of Börgers to allow for subsidized turnout and show that increasing turnout does 
generally increase welfare, if the electorate is sufficiently large (as in Xu 2002). Finally, based on empirical 
observations Lijphart (1997) concludes that welfare increases with turnout by arguing that low turnout is a 
‘serious problem’ because it involves unequal turnout (e.g., the poor vote less than the rich). 
  2  An often-made distinction among voters that may change the impact of poll releases on 
turnout is that between allied voters with stable preferences across legislative periods and 
floating voters who decide on the candidate to support on a case-by-case basis.
6 In fact, the 
substantial uncertainty about the electorate’s level of disagreement caused by floating voters 
is a main reason for pollsters to conduct public opinion polls in the first place. The 
importance of these voters for election outcomes has long been recognized (e.g., Lazarsfeld 
et al. 1948; Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell 1960; Daudt 1961; Converse 1966; Key 1966) 
and is still under investigation (Zaller 2004). Observe that allied and floating voters may 
respond differently to information in polls (e.g., the attachment of allied voters to their group 
may override this information). Our model and data allow us to empirically investigate this. 
Moreover, we will compare the effects of polls in electorates with only floating voters to 
those with both allied and floating voters. 
  The literature on public opinion polls and voter behavior (e.g., Simon 1954; for a 
valuable survey see Irwin and van Holsteyn 2000) has typically focused on the effect of polls 
on candidate choice (e.g., McKelvey and Ordeshook 1984, 1985, 1987; Forsythe et al. 1993; 
Myerson and Weber 1993; Fey 1997). In contrast, we assume fixed preferences because our 
interest lies in the effect of polls on the turnout decision. The participation game of Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) provides a suitable framework for this purpose. This game (to be 
described in detail below) was also used to theoretically study the effect of polls on voter 
turnout and welfare by Goeree and Großer (2007) and Taylor and Yildirim (2006) as well as 
to investigate the effects of other types of information by Diermeier and van Mieghem (2005) 
and Großer and Schram (2006). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to theoretically 
and experimentally investigate uncertainty about the level of disagreement and its resolution 
through poll releases using the participation game framework. In a related experimental 
study, Levine and Palfrey (2007) systematically test the game’s predictions with cost 
uncertainty for two different levels of disagreement under varying electorate sizes. They 
show that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium can explain the comparative statics very well but 
that quantal response equilibrium improves the data fit. They do not study the effects of poll 
                                                 
6 For example, in 2004 the pollster Populus categorized 35% of the UK electorate as floating voters (Times 
Online, 07.09.2004, “Boost for Kennedy as Blair and Howard slip”). Note that the terms ‘floating’ and ‘swing’ 
voters are often used interchangeably. We use the term ‘floating’ to avoid confusion with swing voters in the 
‘swing voter’s curse’ (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996). 
  3releases on voter turnout and welfare, however. We will compare our results to this study, 
where appropriate.
7 
  The laboratory allows us to control for variables that are not the primary focus of 
investigation, but are difficult to correct for in field studies. For example, in our experiment 
we hold the electorate size, voting costs, and benefits from election outcomes constant. We 
then systematically vary the variables of interest such that conclusions can be drawn from 
comparative statics under best possible ceteris paribus  conditions. Specifically,  we 
investigate turnout and welfare by varying one at a time (i) the level of disagreement within 
the electorate and (ii) whether or not polls inform subjects about this level before elections. 
Moreover, the laboratory allows us to create voter alliances by (iii) keeping the preferred 
candidate of allied voters constant across elections. These are distinguished from floating 
voters who may switch from one to the other candidate between elections. In this way, we 
can study the effect of the stability of preferences on turnout and welfare, and make a 
comparison between both voter types. 
2. PARTICIPATION GAMES 
To study the effects of poll releases on turnout and welfare we use a combined analysis of 
Palfrey and Rosenthal’s participation game with complete information (1983, henceforth 
PR83) and with incomplete information about the electorates’ preferences (1985, henceforth 
PR85).
8 The situation we model is where the candidate preferences of some voters are 
private information unless pollsters publish them in the run-up to elections. A formal 
description of the model is presented in an online appendix.
9 
  In the participation game there are two exogenous candidates, A and B, and each voter in 
an electorate of size E supports one of the two. We denote the numbers supporting each 
candidate by   and  , respectively, where  A N B N E N N B A = + . Each voter individually and 
privately decides between voting at a cost   and abstaining (without costs). The 
candidate who receives more votes wins the election (ties are broken by a coin toss) and each 
supporter of this candidate receives an equal reward, independent of whether or not he or she 
0 > c
                                                 
7 Klor and Winter (2007) provide a useful follow-up to our study by using slight variations in the experimental 
design and parameters in order to better compare their data with original field data. They do not take allied 
voters into account, however. Their experimental results essentially confirm our results. An important 
difference is that they rely on subjects’ reported beliefs of being pivotal (cf. Duffy and Tavits 2007). 
8 Alternatively, Myerson (1998) models the participation game as a Poisson game with uncertainty about the 
size of the electorate. He shows that for large electorates both the participation game with complete information 
(PR83) and with incomplete information (PR85) can be approximated by a Poisson game. For the purpose of 
our experimental study, the original participation game is more suitable than the Poisson game. 
9 See ________ (add website). 
  4voted. Supporters of the defeated candidate receive smaller rewards, thus, aggregate benefits 
are larger if the majority-preferred candidate wins. Whereas in PR83 the electorate’s 
preferences are common knowledge, voters only know a common probability distribution of 
these preferences in PR85.
10 The (Bayesian) Nash equilibria and quantal response equilibria, 
both of which specify turnout probabilities, can easily be derived for these games (cf. the 
online appendix). Consequently, each candidate’s winning probability and the expected 
welfare in equilibrium can be derived. Specific predictions for our experimental parameters 
are given in the following sections. We focus on totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy 
equilibria (cf. PR83), in which all voters facing the same decision making situations have the 
same voting probability (strictly between zero and one). 
  To understand how relative turnout probabilities between groups affect welfare, it is 
helpful to look at the participation game’s two inherent conflicts. First, the inter-group 
conflict for the higher rewards stimulates turnout in pivotal situations. Second, the intra-
group conflict to free ride on costly votes by others in the own group suppresses turnout in 
non-pivotal situations. Note that a single vote is either pivotal if there is one vote less by co-
supporters than by the other group (i.e., it can create a tie) or if there are equally many votes 
in the two groups (i.e., it can break a tie). All other situations are non-pivotal. In the totally 
quasi-symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium each voter in the electorate has the same pivot 
probability, because it is determined exogenously by the cost-benefit ratio.
11 For any given 
turnout probability of voters in the other group, the intra-group incentive to abstain is 
increasing in the own group size (as in Olson 1965). As a consequence, polls indicating 
lower levels of disagreement than anticipated yield stronger incentives to abstain in the larger 
than in the smaller group. Ceteris paribus, this may change relative (equilibrium) turnout 
probabilities in favor of the minority-preferred candidate and increase her or his chances in 
the election. This is indeed the case in the Nash equilibrium (but not the quantal response 
equilibrium) for our experimental parameters. 
  To accommodate the possibility of allied voters in the participation game, we need to 
modify it such that we have 
                                                 
10 In PR85 there is also incomplete information about others’ costs of voting, which allows for Bayesian Nash 
equilibria in cutoff strategies. Because our focus is on the resolution of preference uncertainty through polls, we 
avoid confronting subjects in the laboratory with additional sources of uncertainty and use constant costs and 
benefits across voters. 
11 Specifically, the pivot probability is equal to two times the costs, divided by the net benefits from the 
preferred candidate winning (cf. PR83 and the online appendix).  
  5(a) an (equal) minimal group size,  1 ≥ i N , for each group  B A i , = , implying a maximal 
group size of  i N E − , and 
(b) a discrete probability distribution over all possible electoral compositions  , 
, from the set 
) , ( i i N N −
i i − ≠ )} , ( ),..., 1 , 1 ( ), , {( i i i i i i N N E N E N N E N − − − + − , with   
for each element in the set. 
0 (.,.) > prob
To allow for our distinction between allied and floating voters, a repeated setting is needed, 
where the allied voters in the minimal groups stay together for all elections, without changing 
preferences. In contrast, the preferences of floating voters are randomly drawn anew before 
each election. Note that this distinction as such does not depend on whether or not poll 
results are published.  
  There is a small literature studying the participation game experimentally. This includes  
studies on the effects of group and electorate sizes (Rapoport and Bornstein 1989; Schram 
and Sonnemans 1996a; Hsu and Sung 2002; Großer and Giertz 2006; Levine and Palfrey 
2007); the subjective probability of being pivotal (Duffy and Tavits 2007; Klor and Winter 
2007); proportional representation vs. winner-takes-all elections (Schram and Sonnemans 
1996a); different tie breaking rules (Bornstein, Kugler, and Zamir 2005); group identification 
and communication (Bornstein and Rapoport 1988; Bornstein 1992; Schram and Sonnemans 
1996b); reward uncertainty (Cason and Mui 2005) and cost uncertainty (Levine and Palfrey 
2007). Others extend the model to allow for endogenous information about other voters’ 
turnout (Großer and Schram 2006) and endogenous policy making and group formation 
(Großer and Giertz 2006). In all these experiments, relatively high turnout is observed, albeit 
lower than in most general elections around the world. Except for the experiment with cost 
uncertainty (Levine and Palfrey 2007) the standard (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium concept 
finds little empirical support. However, Goeree and Holt (2005), Cason and Mui (2005), and 
Levine and Palfrey (2007) show that quantal response equilibrium can account for the data in 
many cases. Contrary to (Bayesian) Nash, quantal response equilibrium predicts substantial 
turnout (in the order of 50%) in large elections with imperfectly rational voters (Levine and 
Palfrey 2007). 
  63. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
PROCEDURES AND TREATMENTS 
The computerized
12 experiment was run at the laboratory of _______. 288 undergraduate 
students were recruited in 12 sessions of 24 subjects. Each session lasted about 2 hours (cf. 
the online appendix for the read-aloud instructions). Earnings in the experiment were 
expressed in tokens. At the end of a session, token earnings were transferred to cash at a rate 
of 4 tokens to one Dutch Guilder. Subjects earned an average of 56.01 Dutch Guilders (≈ € 
25.42). 
In each session, the 24 subjects were randomly divided into two electorates of  12 = E  
voters. Each electorate consisted of two groups  B A i , = . There was no interaction of any 
kind between subjects in different electorates, and this was known to all of them. Given that 
we do not know the structure of the correlations across observations, we treat the electorate 
as the only independent unit of observation. Hence, each session provides us with two 
independent observations. 
We employed a full 2×2 between subject treatment design with three sessions (six 
electorates) per cell. Our first treatment variable manipulated the information about the 
realized level of support for each candidate. This information was either given at the 
beginning of each round (‘informed’, i.e. a poll is released) or not at all (‘uninformed’, i.e. no 
poll is released). Our second treatment variable manipulated voter alliances. In one treatment 
(‘floating’) there were only floating voters, while in the other (‘mixed’) there were 3 allied 
voters in each group plus 6 floating voters. Throughout, each subject was either an allied or 
floating voter and knew her or his type right from the start. Note that floating voters were 
always reallocated within the same electorate. 
PREFERENCE UNCERTAINTY 
Information and voter alliance were both varied between subjects. To create the possibility of 
preference uncertainty, we varied the level of disagreement within subjects. In any given 
round, each group consisted of a minimum of  3 = i N  voters and a maximum of 9. Any 
integer group size  , where } 9 ,..., 4 , 3 { , ∈ B A N N E N N B A = + , was possible. This means that 
the level of disagreement was highest when each of the two supporter groups consisted of 6 
voters and lowest when a minority of 3 voters faced a majority of 9. We will represent the 
                                                 
12 The experimental software was programmed using RatImage (Abbink and Sadrieh 1995). 
  7level of disagreement by the size of the minority. Note that this level indeed increases as the 
minority does so.  
  The randomization used to determine group sizes proceeds in the following two steps: 
•  Step 1:    3 subjects were allocated to each group. Each subject in the electorate had 
an equal chance of being chosen for either group. 
•  Step 2:    The remaining 6 subjects were independently and randomly allocated, with 
equal probability for each group. 
This procedure was known to all subjects. The way it was applied is different for our 
‘floating’ and ‘mixed’ treatments. In ‘floating’ sessions, both steps were performed at the 
beginning of each round and, importantly, subjects did not know at which step they were 
allocated to the groups. In ‘mixed’ sessions, step 1 determined the 6 subjects to take the role 
of allied voters and their group allocation. This step was performed only once, at the 
beginning of the first round, while step 2 reallocated the 6 floating voters at the beginning of 
each round. Notice that step 2 produces a binomial distribution of group sizes with  5 . 0 = p , 
where electoral composition (6,6) occurs with probability .3125, (5,7) and (7,5) each with 
.2344, (4,8) and (8,4) each with .0938, and (3,9) and (9,3) each with .0156. 
Each session consisted of 100 decision rounds.
13 The electoral composition was varied 
in a random, but predetermined manner across rounds (see the online appendix for the 
complete sequence). 33 rounds used the composition (6,6), 23 used (5,7), 22 used (7,5), 9 
used (4,8), 9 used (8,4), 2 used (3,9), and 2 used (9,3). Whether subjects knew the actual 
levels of support in each group when making their decisions depends on the information 
treatment. In the ‘informed’ sessions, the actual ‘own’ and ‘other’ group’s levels of support 
were announced at the beginning of each round, while in the ‘uninformed’ sessions these 
were never released.
14 Hence, subjects in ‘uninformed’ faced the same decision problem in 
15
                                                
each round.   
 
13 Due to a computer crash, one session had to be stopped after 94 rounds. 
14 Groups were labeled ‘own’ and ‘other’ to avoid floating voters associating with either group. 
15 However, ‘uninformed’ allied and floating voters have different information about the level of disagreement. 
An allied voter knows that there are at least 3 (at most 9) voters in each group. A floating voter, on the other 
hand, knows that there are at least 4 voters in her or his own group and at most 8 in the other. As a consequence, 
in the ‘mixed’ treatment allied voters have an expected ‘own’ group size of 6, whereas for floating voters 
Bayesian updating yields an expected ‘own’ group size of 6.5. When there are only floating voters, this 
expectation is 6.25. 
  8PAYOFF PARAMETERS 
In each round, each voter of the winning group received 4 tokens and each voter of the 
defeated group re independent of a 
subject’s  gative  ere Tab mmariz ts and 
par
LE  MARY OF TREATMENTS AND PARAMETERS 
ceived 1 token. As the cost of turnout was 1 token (
type), ne payoffs w  avoided.  le 1 su es treatmen
ameters. 
TAB 1: SUM
Treatment  Acronym  # Floating  # Allied 
voters  voters   Poll release 
Uninformed Floating      UF  12  0  No 
Uninformed Mixed       UM    6  6  No 
Informed Floating       IF  12  0  Yes 
Informed Mixed       IM    6  6  Yes 
Notes: All treatments had 100 rounds and electorates of 12 voters, with a minimum (maximum) of 3 
(9) in each group. A victory (defeat) payed 4 (1) to each voter in the group and the individual costs of 
equil
voting were equal to 1. We have observations from 6 independent electorates per treatment. 
 
4. EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS 
For the parameters of our experiment, we can numerically derive (Bayesian) Nash  ibria 
in totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategies as well as quantal response equilibria (McKelvey 
and Palfrey 1995). The latter are characterized by a non-negative ‘noise’ parameter μ .
16 The 
(Bayesian) Nash equilibrium is a limit case of the quantal response equilibrium for  0 = μ . At 
the other extreme, when μ → ∞ the equilibrium probability of voting approaches 0.5, which 
represents purely random behavior. Our equilibrium analysis is described in detail in the 
online appendix, using the logit specification of the quantal response equilibrium (‘logit 
equilibrium’; McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). Here, we first present aggregate turnout 
probabilities for our experimental parameters in the various equilibria. We continue by 
giving comparative static equilibrium predictions of turnout probabilities across levels of 
supp
                                                
ort and disagreement; probabilities of winning; and expected welfare. The quantitative 
predictions for these variables of interest are postponed until the following sections, where 
they will be directly compared to the data. 
 
16 We have also derived pure strategy (Bayesian) Nash equilibria. However, these do not provide us with 
testable predictions about our treatment effects and, hence, are only briefly described here. In the ‘informed’ 
treatments (IF and IM), full turnout is the pure strategy equilibrium when both candidates have equal levels of 
support of 6. For all asymmetric pairs of support levels, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. In the 
‘uninformed’ treatments (UF and UM) there is no pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium with full turnout. 
For UF the only Bayesian Nash equilibria in pure strategies are those, where one voter of either group votes and 
all others abstain. No Bayesian Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist for UM. 
  9Figure 1 gives the equilibrium probabilities of turnout per treatment as a function of the 
noise level μ . For the informed treatments (IF and IM) these probabilities are aggregated as 
weighted averages of the probabilities for the distinct levels of support used in our 
experiments. For the voters at the time of 
the election so we show one aggregate turnout probability. We show separate turnout 
probabilities for allied and floating voters in ‘uninformed’ (UF and UM) where slight 
differences may occur between them in the expected levels of disagreement (cf. footnote 19). 
FIGURE 1: EQUILIBRIUM TURNOUT PER TREATMENT 











































Notes: The lines give the logit equilibria for varying μ  from 0 to 2 and 
the discrete cases 10, 100, and 1000 (which show up as a ‘jump’ 
upwards, with turnout probabilities close to 0.5). Where distinct lines can 
no longer be visually separated, one line represents all. 
 
In the Bayesian Nash equilibrium ( 0 = μ ) for the uninformed treatments, average expected 
turnout is substantially higher when there are allied and floating voters (53% in UM) than 
v
when all voters are floating (10% in UF). The latter turnout is close to the Nash equilibrium 
for the informed treatments (11%). The high turnout in UM is entirely due to the very high 
turnout probability of allied voters (94%). In contrast, the 12% voting probability for floating 
oters in UM is similar to the other treatments. 
  When noise is introduced the equilibrium predictions across treatments quickly converge. 
From a noise level of approximately  3 . 0 = μ  upwards, equilibrium turnout probabilities are 
virtually identical across voter types and treatments. These logit equilibria are increasing in 
e that for these noi ls they give qualitatively different predictions than  μ. Not se leve
(Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. In particular, except for allied voters in UM higher turnout is 
  10predicted than in the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. A noise level of 0.3 lies below the levels 
reported for previous participation game ments. E.g., Goeree and Ho  experi lt (2005) estimate 
8 . 0 = μ  in early rounds and  4 . 0 = μ  in later rounds for the Schram and Son ns (1996a) 
data with symmetric group sizes of 6 and costs and benefits similar to our parameters. Hence, 
we will use the turnout probabilities for  3 . 0 ≥
nema
μ  for our logit predictions.  
  Consequently, in the following we use (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium ( 0 = μ ) and logit 
equilibrium for  3 . 0 ≥ μ  to derive qualitative theoretical results (TR) relevant to our 
experiments.
17 These equilibria specify turnout probabilities (disaggregated per level of 
support) and we can use them to derive equilibrium predictions for winning probabilities and 
expected welfare as well. We do so in aggregate and as well as per level of support and per 
level of disagreement. By comparing the equilibria for uninformed and informed electorates, 
we can establish the predicted effects of poll releases. Confronting our TR with our 
experimental results will allow us to determine which equilibrium concept provides better 
and the logit equilibrium ng a noise level larger than 0.3). 
(i) In the absence of noisy behavior, polls do not affect   
y but highest for average support levels. 
and decreases it for relatively small or large levels. 
                                                
comparative statics, thus, better predicts the welfare consequences of polls. To do so, we 
present each TR in two parts: the Bayesian Nash prediction (assuming no noisy behavior) 




aggregate expected turnout when there are only floating voters but substantially decrease it 
when there are both allied and floating voters. (ii) With noisy behavior, polls do not affect 
aggregate expected turnout. 
TR2 (turnout per level of support):  (i) Without noisy behavior, majority voters turn out 
less than minority voters but turnout probabilities are equal across support levels for 
uninformed electorates. When there are only floating voters, polls raise turnout in the 
minority and decrease it in the opposing majority. When there are allied and floating voters, 
the predicted turnout for the uninformed is high, so that polls substantially decrease turnout 
for all levels of support. (ii) When behavior is noisy, turnout probabilities are somewhat 
higher in the minority than in the opposing majorit
Because all uninformed voters have a (same) predicted turnout in between the levels 
predicted for the informed, polls increase turnout probabilities for average levels of support 
 
17 Due to imperfect monitoring after elections (voters only observe aggregate turnout) there may also be ‘private 
sequential equilibria’ (Mailath, Matthews, and Sekiguchi 2002). For our setting it is infeasible to compute such 
repeated game equilibria, however.  
  11 
TR3 (turnout per level of disagreement):   (i) In the absence of noisy behavior, expected 
turnout slightly decreases in the level of disagreement in informed electorates. Once again, 
(for obvious reasons) turnout of the uninformed is not predicted to be affected by the level of 
disagreement. The predicted turnout for uninformed is such that polls (slightly) increase 
expected turnout for all levels of disagreement when there are only floating voters and 
decrease it for all levels when there are allied and floating voters. (ii) With noisy behavior, 
expected turnout increases in the level of disagreement in informed electorates. Polls increase 
ces in the election than the minority opponent and this advantage strongly 
increases in the level of support in both informed and uninformed electorates. Polls 
 When there are allied and 
floating voters polls increase expected welfare for most levels of disagreement. (ii) When 
expected turnout for high levels of disagreement and decrease it for low levels, irrespective 
of the presence of allied voters. 
TR4 (winning probabilities):  (i) Without noisy behavior, the majority-preferred 
candidate in informed electorates has a lower chance to win than the minority candidate. This 
perhaps somewhat surprising result is due to the higher free-riding incentives in larger 
groups. The difference between the majority and minority is decreasing in the level of 
disagreement (i.e., in close elections the chances are more or less equal). The majority-
preferred candidate always has better chances in uninformed electorates (where everyone of 
the same type votes with the same probability). This advantage is strongly increasing in the 
level of support, and even more so when there are allied voters. As a consequence, polls 
decrease the majority-preferred candidate’s probability of winning for all levels of 
disagreement. (ii) In the presence of noisy behavior, the majority-preferred candidate always 
has better chan
somewhat diminish this advantage of the majority-preferred candidate for all levels of 
disagreement. 
TR5 (social welfare):  (i) When behavior is not noisy, expected social (or aggregate) welfare 
increases in the level of disagreement in all cases, but most strongly so for informed 
electorates. This is a natural consequence of TR4. It is bad for welfare if the minority wins 
and the probability of this happening is largest for low levels of disagreement. For 
uninformed electorates expected welfare is low for all levels of disagreement when there are 
allied voters (due to their expected high, costly turnout). When there are only floating voters, 
polls decrease expected welfare for all levels of disagreement.
  12behavior is noisy, polls have little effect on expected social welfare, which is a U-shaped 
function of the level of disagreement in all informed treatments. 
nalyze 
turnout behavior at the individual level. To provide a benchmark for our data, we will 
ecific (Bayesian) Nash predictions and logit predictions for the 
aboratory findings are summarized as experimental results (ER). 
Aggregate turnout 
Figure 2 shows turnout rates averaged over blocks of 20 rounds each.  
FIGURE 2: AGGREGATE TURNOUT RATES 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The presentation and analysis of our experimental results is organized as follows. We start by 
discussing observed effects of polls on turnout rates in aggregate and per level of support and 
disagreement (5.1). Thereafter, we investigate turnout rates per voter type (5.2). Then, we 
examine winning probabilities (5.3) and welfare (5.4). Many of our statistical tests are based 
on nonparametric statistics as described in Siegel and Castellan, Jr. (1988). For the reasons 
mentioned above, these tests are conducted at the electorate level (qualitative conclusions are 
based on one-tailed tests). In addition, random effects probit estimations are used to a
frequently provide the sp
cases concerned.
18 L






















UF IF UM IM
Notes:  UF=uninformed el
 
ectorates with only 
                                                
floating voters; IF=informed electorates with only 
floating voters; UM=uninformed electorates with 
allied and floating voters; IM=informed electorates 
with allied and floating voters. 
 
18 These are the predictions underlying figure 1 and TR1-TR5. The online appendix gives a table providing a 
full overview of the equilibria per treatment, using μ = 0.4 and 0.8 for the logit equilibria. 
  13We observe higher rates when electorates are informed about the levels of support than when 
they are not. This holds for all blocks of rounds: the turnout rate is always higher in IF than 
ments start at similar levels, a difference 
of approximately 10%-points exists between informed and uninformed electorates from the 
the null hypothesis of no difference in average 
in UF and higher in IM than in UM. Though all treat
second block onward for both comparisons. 
ER1:  Polls increase turnout levels by 22-28%. 
SUPPORT.  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests reject 
turnout in favor of higher rates for informed electorates at the 5% significance level for the IF-UF 
comparison and at the 10% level for IM-UM. The increase in turnout is approximately 28% when all 
voters float and 22% when there are allied voters. 
We can compare this result to TR1. ER1 clearly rejects the (Bayesian) Nash prediction in 
TR1 (i) that polls decrease aggregate turnout in electorates with allied and floating voters; in 
fact, the reverse holds. Note, however, that turnout levels are much closer to those derived by 
logit equilibrium for  3 . 0 ≥ μ  than to those by the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium (cf. figures 1 
and 2). Specifically, the Bayesian Nas iction of 10% turnout for UF (53% for UM) is 
much lower (higher) than the 31% (37%) observed, and the Nash predictions of 11% in both 
IF and IM are much smaller than the observed 40% and 45%, respectively. In comparison, 
the logit predictions using  4 . 0 =
h pred
μ  ( 8 . 0 = μ ) lie for all treatments between 30% and 31% 
servations. Hence, aggregate turnout can be 
better explained by the logit equilibrium than the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium, though the 
Turnout per levels of support and disagreement 
Figure 3 shows turnout rates per level of support (left panel) and level of disagreement (right 
         FIGURE 3: TURNOUT RATES 
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(38% and 39%) and are much closer to our ob
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Notes: The bars in both figures show turnout rates for informed electorates per level of support (left panel) and 
per level of disagreement (right panel). In the left panel, the lines with markers give turnout levels for 
uninformed electorates. The remaining lines show for informed electorates our Nash predictions and logit 
predictions for noise levels µ = 0.4 and 0.8. The level of disagreement is measured by the size of the minority. 
For the uninformed treatments (UF and UM), there is no reason to expect turnout to vary 
across levels because subjects do not know the electorate’s actual preferences. This is 
ore specifically, we estimate a panel model explaining the individual 
decision to vote or abstain for each of our four treatments separately. As explanatory 
variables we consider the various levels of support a voter is confronted with  h c n only
affect behavior in our informed treatments), a time trend, and a set of lagged variables. The 
concerned had been pivotal ( ) in the previous round. Note that if subjects use totally 
quasi-symmetric mixed strategies, their turnout decisions should not be affected by past 
events. We distinguish between allied and floating voters in our mixed treatments. 
confirmed in the left panel. For the informed treatments (IF and IM), figure 3 (right panel) 
shows that turnout generally increases in the level of disagreement. The left panel reveals 
that this holds for both the minority and majority (because turnout decreases as one moves 
away from group size 6 in either direction).
19 Moreover, a comparison of turnout left and 
right of the median group size in the left panel shows that turnout is always lower in the 
minority than in the corresponding majority. Finally, observe the very high turnout rates of 
49% in IF and 58% in IM for the highest disagreement level; the former can only be only 
justified by the logit equilibrium for unreasonably high noise levels and the latter cannot be 
explained by any of our equilibria (cf. figure 1). 
  A first general conclusion about the effect of polls on turnout per level of support can be 
derived from figure 3. This is that polls increase turnout for intermediate group sizes and 
decrease turnout for small or large groups. For a more detailed analysis of the effects of poll 
releases on voter turnout we consider the effect at the individual level, using random effects 
probit estimations. M
(whic a  
latter include the own previous turnout decision and indicators of situations where the voter 
ex post
                                                 
19 The only exception to these observations is found when moving from group size 3 to 4 in IM. 
  15Specifically, for the treatments with only floating voters, denoted by superscript F, the panel 
model is given by
20 
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where i denotes the voter, and t denotes the round. 
F
t i D ,  (
M
t i D , ) is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if i voted in t, and 0 otherwise. AL in  )   2   ( is a dummy variable equal to 1 if i is an allied 
voter, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, superscripts fl and al indicate whether the independent 
variable concerns a floating or llied voter (we omit superscripts  fl in  )   1   (  where there are 
only floating voters). Δ t i LS ,  and Δ t i LS ,  measure (absolute) differences in the levels of 
support between the two parties, where sup
, 1 , 12 1 , 11 1 , 10
, 0






+ + − − − −
 a
script ’) indicate that   is in the minority 
a
< >




1 , − t i PIV  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the previous round, i abstained 
(denoted by superscript ‘0’) and was pivotal ex post, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
1
1 , − t i PIV  is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the previous round, i voted (denoted by superscript ‘1’) and 
was pivotal, and 0 otherwise.  t i, ε  and  i μ  are error terms, where the latter is a random effect 
used to correct for the panel structure in our data. Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the coefficients of this model. 
  Table 2 can be used to distinguish between various effects of poll releases on voter 
turnout. First consider electorates with only floating voters. As already shown in figure 3, 
turnout increases in the level of disagreement (measured by − nd 
fl LS Δ
, > − ) in IF. 
The coefficients −0.20 and −0.13 are both negative and highly significant, and indicate that 
fl








 level of disagreement as measured by the size of the minority 
t i, t i,
20 T  more  se, eqs. (1) and (2) specify the linear (random) utility model underlying the probit estima-
tions.  
21 
< ΔLS  and 
> ΔLS are inversely related to the t i, t i,
(SoM). Specifically, SoM = 6 −(
< ΔLS )/2 = 6 − (
> ΔLS )/2. 
  16the minority responds more strongly to differences in support than the majority. As a 
consequence, the relationship between the level of support and the probability of voting is 
inversely U-shaped.
22 As expected, the levels of disagreement do not affect turnout in UF. 
Interestingly, poll releases suppress other influences on voter turnout: previous turnout 
   the vote 
probability in UF, but no such effects are o served in IF. It se s like subjects use 
from previous elections to d ine their choice if here is n urrent 
vailab re e rs e 
n 5.2 for tw fe ow 
being pivotal previously significantly incre ter t of 
inally, we find a downward tre
ABLE FFEC URN
( 1 1 , = −
fl

















ation  ter o c
m  a ation le. Very similar  sults hold when  re are allied vote  in the electorat
   a comparison be een both vot es). The main dif rence is that n
es  of informed vo s in three ou
nd across rounds in all treatments except IM. 
T  2: RANDOM E TS PROBIT ESTIMA ONS OF VOTE OUT 
Coefficients  Constant  d  an
independent  IF  variables  UF  UM  IM 
Constan       t      -0.93 (16.18)***      0.07 (1.00)      -1.03 (14.77)**      0.29 (4.80)*** *
t / 100  **      -0.40 (6.23)***      -0.20 (3.44)*     -0.18 (2.76)**     -0.05 (0.82)  * 
fl
t i D 1 , −        0.48 ( 0)***       0.00 ( 4)    9.2 0.0      0.87 (11.47)*     -0.02 (0.30)  **
al
t i D 1 , −   -  -       0.39 (5.27)***      -0.00 (0.03) 















< Δ   -  -            -0.24 (13.26)***  0.02 (0.88) 













1 , −   -  -       0.12 (1.71)*      -0.04 (0.57) 
al
t i 1 , −   -  -       0.37  PIV
, 1 (4.89)***       0.15 (2.16)** 
Notes: The dependent variable is the voters’ binary choice between voting (= 1) and abstaining (= 0). The 
independent variables in column 1 are defined in the main text. Absolute z-values are given in parentheses. * 
(**; ***) indicates significance at the 10% (5%; 1%) level. Results on the random effects estimates are 
available on request. 
The following result summarizes our findings.
23 
ER2:  Polls cause turnout to increase in the level of disagreement, but stronger so for the 
minority than for the majority. Turnout probabilities always remain higher in the 
                                                 
22 Recall from figure 3, however, that even voters in a minority of 3 turn out at a lower rate than voters in the 
opposing majority of 9. 
23 ER2 is also supported by nonparametric tests using electorates as the unit of observation. More details are 
available from the authors. 
  17majority than in the corresponding minority. Without polls, both being pivotal and 
having voted in the previous election increases turnout. 
We can compare this result to TR2 and TR3 and the equilibrium turnout probabilities shown 
in figure 3. The inverse U-shape in the relationship between the level of support and turnout 
for informed treatments supports the logit predictions, but rejects the (Bayesian) Nash 
The latter experiment includes uncertainty about voting costs.
24 Concerning the 
 predictions that turnout increases in this level 
ses (decrease) turnout for higher (lower) levels, but rejects the (Bayesian) 
Nash predictions (cf. TR3).  
 voters start out relatively small, but they increase to an 
7% in the last three blocks of rounds for the UM-UF and IM-IF 
comparisons, respectively. Only the latter difference is statistically significant, however. 
of no difference in turnout rates for the UM-UF and IM-IF comparisons at the 10%-level. 
                                                
predictions (cf. TR2). However, our finding that turnout rates are not higher in the minority 
than in the opposing majority rejects both equilibrium predictions. A similar result is reported 
in Großer and Giertz (2006) and Klor and Winter (2007) with certainty about voting costs, 
but Levine and Palfrey’s (2007) experiment supports the predicted higher turnout for the 
minority. 
levels of disagreement, ER2 supports the logit
and that polls increa
  To conclude, this subsection has shown that poll releases have strong effects on voter 
turnout. Polls often redirect the voters’ attention away from past events towards the current 
level of disagreement. This information yields important regularities in observed voter 
turnout; most strikingly, turnout increases in the level of disagreement (i.e., closeness 
matters). 
5.2 TURNOUT RATES AND VOTER ALLIANCES 
Aggregate turnout 
Figure 2 not only shows an increase in aggregate turnout rates due to polls, but also that the 
presence of allied voters boosts participation. Turnout differences between all-floating 
electorates and electorates with allied
average of 24% and 1
ER3:  When there are polls, electorates with allied voters have higher turnout levels in later 
rounds. 
SUPPORT. Across all rounds, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests cannot reject the null hypothesis 
 
24 Though this suggests that the cost setup may be important, we can think of another explanation for the 
discrepancy: Subjects in Levine and Palfrey’s study faced the same level of disagreement in fifty consecutive 
rounds. This stable learning environment is not present in our environment (nor in the other two mentioned), 
where the level frequently changes.  
  18Considering blocks 3-5 only, rates are significantly higher in IM than in IF (5% level) but the 
difference UM-UF is not significant. 
Turnout per vo
Figure 4 gives observed turnout rates per voter type. It shows that polls increase floating 
voters’ participation by 55% but leave turnout by allied voters unaffected. One way to 
summarize the data underlying figure 4 is that turnout is around 40% for allied voters 
(independent of polls) as well as for informed floating voters (irrespective of the presence of 
allied voters). Only uninformed floating voters vote at a lower rate of approximately 30% 
(once again, irrespective of whether or not there are allied voters). 























Allied Floating UF IF  
ER4:  The increase in turnout levels through polls is entirely due to floating voters. 
turnout rates between allied voters in the IM-UM comparison, but rejects it between floating voters in 
favor of higher rates in IM than UM at the 5% level. Reca
SUPPORT. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in 
ll from ER1 that when there are no allied 
polls are prohibited (cf. figure 4): allied voters turn out 44% more than floating voters in UM 
and 8% less in IM. Though these differences are not statistically significant at the electorate 
voters, floating voters turnout significantly more in IF than in UF. 
It is interesting that turnout rates of floating voters are not affected by the presence of allied 
voters (as expected from the figure, the relevant differences are statistically insignificant). 
However, the random effects probit estimations reported in table 2 do reveal some 
differences. For example, floating voters respond to ex post pivotalness in the previous round 








1 , − ) but not so if there 
are only floating voters (0.01 and 0.00, respectively).  
  Directly comparing the two voter types, we find larger differences in turnout rates when 
  19level (Wilcoxon signed ranks  lev that  recting 
for other factors the ind
 tests, 10% el) the results in table 2 show  after cor
ividual uninformed allied voter is significantly more likely to vote 
probabilities in figure 1. In UM, the differences between higher rates of allied voters and 
rates of floating voters are much smaller than in the Bayesian Nash prediction. 
Moreover, turnout of allied voters is not large enough to boost the rates in UM above those in 
ove− t
than an uninformed floating voter; whereas an informed allied voter is significantly less 
likely to vote than an informed floating voter (the respective coefficients in table 2 for AL are 
0.70 in UM and −0.23 in IM). Note, however, that allied and floating voters respond in very 
similar ways to the information about the level of disagreement that is revealed by polls 
(compare the coefficient for 
fl
t i LS Δ
,
,
< −  to  al
t i LS Δ ,
,
< − as well as 
fl
t i LS Δ
,
,





> Δ −  in the 
last column of table 2).  
  We can compare observed turnout rates in figure 4 to our equilibrium turnout 
lower 
the other three treatments, which is predicted by the (Bayesian) Nash equilibria. On the other 
hand, differences in observed turnout rates across voter types and treatments are closer to 
−but still substantially ab he (near zero) differences predicted by the logit equilibria for 
3 . 0 ≥ μ .     
5.3 WINNING PROBABILITIES 
Both equilibrium concepts pred igher in the minority 
than in the opposing majority after polls have been released. In the Nash equilibrium (but not 
e
ict that turnout probabilities will be h
th  logit equilibrium for 3 . 0 ≥ μ ), this difference is large enough to give the minority a higher 
probability of winning the election. However, observed turnout rates are not higher in the 
minority (cf. figure 3), which means that the majority wins more often. Figure 5 compares 
observed majority winning rates with and without polls.  
FIGURE 5: WINNING RATES 


















































































































   (µ=.8)
(µ=.8)
Notes: Bars show the observed frequency of majority wins for the level of support shown. Lines show 
theoretical predictions based on Nash equilibrium, logit equilibrium and social welfare maximization. 
For presentational reasons, the logit predictions for µ = 0.4 are not shown. These lie between the 
Bayesian Nash predictions and logit predictions for µ = 0.8. 
 
It also shows the theoretical predictions including the social welfare maximizing winning 
‘majori
an 50% of the time and (with one exception) 
y for the support levels of 7 
or not polls are released (cf. both panels 
in figure 5). When informed, a majority of 7 voters has a significantly higher chance of 
 the discussion above. 
and level of disagreement (‘social welfare’). Using equilibrium turnout probabilities to 
probabilities.
25 We add the (6,6) case for comparison, defining the winning rate of the 
ty’ as 50%. 
  The figure shows that majorities win more th
the chance that they win is increasing in the level of support. For the uninformed treatments, 
this is a direct consequence of equal average turnout rates across the levels of support (since 
subjects cannot respond to what they don’t know). Moreover, onl
do the winning rates depend significantly on whether 
winning than when there are no polls (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests, 5% significance level 
for only floating voters and 10% level when mixed). These observations give: 
ER5:  Majorities have a higher probability of winning the elections than the opposing 
minorities. 
 
SUPPORT.  This follows from
Comparing this result to TR4 (and to the theoretical predictions depicted in figure 5 we 
observe that the logit equilibrium predicts the comparative statics much better than the 
(Bayesian) Nash equilibrium.    
5.4 WELFARE EFFECTS 
We consider the effects polls have on welfare at both the level of support (‘group welfare’) 
                                                 
25 In case of unequal levels of support, social welfare is maximized if one majority-voter turns out and 
everybody else abstains. When support levels are equal social welfare is maximized if everybody abstains.   
  21calculate expected payoffs in equilibrium we can determine expected group and social 
welfare.
26 From these, equilibrium welfare effects are calculated as the welfare with poll 
fare without such information and compared to our data. 
tions. 
for the largest support level), we observe that 
the majorities are the groups whose welfare is more often boosted by the release of polls.  
Whereas 5 of the 6 majorities shown in figure 6 are better off with polls, this holds for only 2 
Social welfare effects 
Table 3 shows the effects polls have on social welfare, distinguishing between the cases with 
only floating voters (columns 2 to 6) and with allied and floating voters (columns 7 to 11). 
Rows present the Bayesian Nash predictions, logit predictions for 
releases minus the wel
Group welfare effects 
Figure 6 show the observed and predicted group welfare effects across levels of support. It 
reveals a stark contrast between our predictions and our observa Whereas equilibria 
generally predict that polls benefit the minority and harm the majority (i.e., the lines start 
above zero and decline to a negative prediction 
of the 6 minorities. 
4 . 0 = μ  and 0.8, and data. 
One again, we find stark differences between the theoretical predictions and our observations 
 
FIGURE 6: EFFECTS OF POLLS ON GROUP WELFARE 



























































































































































Logit   0.4
Logit   0.8 (µ=.8)
(µ=.4)
  
h predictions and logit predictions for μ equal to 0.4 and 0.8). 
Notes: The figure shows the effects of polls on group welfare, separately for only floating voters (left panel) 
and for allied and floating voters (right panel). Effects are measured as group welfare with polls – group 
welfare without polls. Bars show observed values of this difference across support levels and lines show 
theoretically predicted effects (Bayesian Nas
 
TABLE 3: EFFECTS OF POLLS ON SOCIAL WELFARE 
                                                 
26 In the online appendix we relate predicted and observed welfare to maximum surplus and determine the 
efficiency of elections. 
  22  Only floating voters  Allied and floating voters 
Level of 
disagreement  3  4  5  6  Weighted 
average  3  4  5  6  Weighted 
average 
Bayesian  Nash -1.49 -0.66 -0.19 -0.02  -0.26  -0.07 0.92  1.50  0.84  1.14 
logit  4 . = μ   -0.35 -0.19 -0.12 -0.05  -0.12  -0.33 -0.18 -0.11 -0.05  -0.11 
logit  8 . = μ   -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05  -0.05  -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05  -0.04 
O 0.14 0.45 0.07 -0.45  -0.02  bserved  0.72 0.00 0.01 -0.36  -0.08 
No : Entries in the cell represent the predicted or observed effe tes cts of poll releases on social welfare for the 
tuation depicted by the column. The average effect is weighted by the relative frequency with which the level 
The th
monotonically increasing in the level of disagreement (i.e., polls are predicted to harm social 
si
of disagreement occurs in our experiment.  
eoretical predicted social welfare effect of polls is generally negative and often 
welfare and mostly so in lopsided elections; exceptions are found for the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium with allied voters). The logit equilibrium smoothes out social welfare effects, 
yielding close to zero values for  8 . 0 = μ . Our data, on the other hand, only show a negative 
social welfare effect of polls for the highest disagreement level. Because this observed 
negative welfare effect weighs relatively highly in the weighted average this results in a 
small negative average welfare effect of −0.08 when there are only floating voters and −0.02 
when there are allied and floating voters. 
  We summarize our findings in the following result: 
 
ER6:  Polls mostly increase majority welfare and decrease or barely affect minority 
and for support level 6 in the IF-UF 
comparison (10% level). Equal group payoffs are rejected in favor of higher payoffs with polls for 
or IF-UF; 10% level for IM-UM) and for majorities of 8 for IM-UM (5% 
t 
welfare. Without allied voters, social welfare decreases when the level of 
disagreement is highest. 
SUPPORT.  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference between group 
payoffs with and without polls in favor of lower payoffs with polls for minorities of 5 for both the IF-
UF and IM-UM comparisons (1% and 10% significance level) 
majorities of 7 (5% level f
level). For all other minorities and majorities the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (10% level). 
Moreover, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference between 
aggregate electorate payoffs with and without polls in favor of lower payoffs with polls for a level of 
disagreement of 6 for IF-UF (10% significance level), but for no other comparison at the 
disagreement level (10% level). 
The logit equilibrium predicts the observed effects of polls on group and social welfare 
relatively better than the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (cf. TR5). However, the logi
  23equilibrium cannot capture our ER6 either. Though the opposite is predicted by all our 
equilibria, our data suggest that the majority-preferred candidate should favor poll releases 
and the minority-preferred candidate should oppose them.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of our study is to shed light on the effects of public opinion polls in two-candidate 
majoritarian elections. To do so, we use a novel setup where we theoretically and 
experimentally analyze and compare participation games where polls inform the electorate 
lection and decrease social 
serve that polls mostly 
about the level of support for each candidate to those where voters remain uninformed. We 
believe one of the advantages of this method to be that political engineers can adapt it to 
study their own particular interests. Nevertheless, the environment we chose has allowed us 
to draw a variety of conclusions about the influence of poll releases on turnout and welfare. 
  Our Bayesian Nash analysis as well as the complementary theoretical work by Goeree 
and Großer (2007) and Taylor and Yildirim (2006) suggest that polls may have negative 
effects on social welfare. The main reason is that voters who (unexpectedly) learn that they 
are in a minority may be stimulated to participate substantially more than they had originally 
planned to do. This can diminish expected benefits from the e
welfare. This effect is most pronounced in electorates with low levels of disagreement (i.e., 
lopsided elections) where the incentive to free ride on costly votes of co-supporters is 
particularly weak in minorities and strong in majorities.  
  Our experimental results show that, overall, turnout is higher after polls have been 
released. Not all elections are equally affected by polls, however. The difference in turnout 
between electorates with and without polls is most striking for ex ante close races (where the 
level of disagreement is highest). For such elections, polls do yield severe welfare losses 
because turnout is much higher than is socially optimal. When elections are less close, the 
welfare consequences depend on the group a voter belongs to. We ob
increase majority welfare and decrease or barely affect minority welfare. This can be 
attributed mainly to our observation that, contrary to the Nash predictions, informed majo-
rities achieve a victory more often than the opposing minorities. 
  When distinguishing between allied and floating voters we observe that the higher 
turnout in informed electorates is caused by floating voters, who vote much less when there 
are no polls. Note that this cannot be attributed to them having lower stakes in the election 
outcome than allied voters (as is often assumed about floating voters). Our laboratory control 
allowed us to distinguish allied from floating voters on one dimension, to wit the instability 
  24in their preferences across elections. This instability causes uncertainty about the electorate’s 
level of disagreement. We kept the stakes across voter types constant. Our experimental 
results show that the uncertainty per se is enough to reduce turnout by floating voters, with 
the consequences for aggregate turnout and welfare discussed above. 
  Generally, (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium poorly predicts experimental results for 
participation games while logit equilibrium provides substantially more accurate predictions 
(Cason and Mui 2005; Goeree and Holt 2005). Our results fit well into this general picture: 
our data do not support (Bayesian) Nash predictions but to a large extent coincide with those 
derived from logit equilibrium. In particular, most turnout levels and the patterns of turnout 
across levels of support and disagreement are explained very well by the latter equilibrium 
concept. Moreover, it mitigates the strong effects of polls on welfare predicted by Bayesian 
Nash, bringing our theoretical predictions much closer to the data. However, two of our 
experimental results remain at odds with logit equilibrium as well: (i) that majority voters 
turn out at a higher probability than the opposing minority voters in informed electorates 
(and, related to this, that polls generally increase majority but not minority welfare); (ii) that 
turnout is 50% or higher when support is equally divided across both candidates. There are 
ble and we therefore leave this for future research. 
Of course, our study of the effect of public opinion poll releases on turnout and welfare is 
to some extent limited. For example, we ignored the possibility that the information in polls 
 by respondents who act strategically, and hence polls may be less 
e focused on majority rule. Results may 
                                                
various possible reasons why logit equilibrium fails here. We favor an explanation based on 
‘group think’ (Bacharach 2006) where some voters determine their turnout decision based on 
group utilitarian rather than individualistic motives. In this setting, group welfare as opposed 
to individual well-being determines the voter’s decision. Using this as a point of departure 
for informed electorates, one can once again calculate Nash equilibrium voting probabilities 
(Feddersen and Sandroni 2006). It turns out that Nash equilibria calculated in this way 
already predict quite well the comparative statics that we observe across support levels.
27 In 
particular, they correctly predict the higher turnout probabilities in the majority and an 
average turnout of 50% for the highest level of disagreement. A further improvement of the 
fit between predictions and observations may be obtained by combining the group think and 




representative than in our study. Moreover, we hav
 
27 More details are available from the authors. 
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ortional representation (as pointed out by Irwin and van Holsteyn 2000). 
uture research should relax some of the assumptions in our setup (e.g., using larger 
mitations, we are confident that our setup can be extended to other situations and thus 
elfare. Our present theoretical and experimental results are a first important step in this 
be different for prop
F
electorates with a larger variety of disagreement levels, asymmetric distributions of support 
levels, endogenous poll responses, and different electoral rules). By relaxing these and other 
li





See our online appendix on _______ (add website) REFERENCES 
 
Abbink, Klaus, and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. 1995. “RatImage: Research Assistance Toolbox for 
Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments.” University of Bonn. Discussion Paper B-
25. 
acharach, Michael. 2006. Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. 
erelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. Voting: A Study of 
örgers, Tilman. 2004, “Costly Voting.” American Economic Review 94 (March), 57-66. 
m in Intergroup Conflicts Over Step-Level 
nd Continuous Public Goods.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62 (April): 
ornstein, Gary, and Amnon Rapoport. 1988. “Intergroup Competition for the Provision of 
ornstein, Gary, Tamar Kugler, and Shmuel Zamir. 2005. “One Team Must Win, the Other 
rown, Kenneth M., and Charles E. Zech. 1973. “Welfare Effects of Announcing Election 
rown, Lloyd B., and Henry W. Chappell, Jr. 1999. “Forecasting Using History and the 
ampbell, Angus. 1960. “Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change.” Public Opinion 
ampbell, Colin M. 1999. “Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities.” Journal of Political 
ampbell, James E. 1996. “Polls and Votes: The Trial Heat Presidential Election Forecasting 
ason, Timothy N., and Vai-Lam Mui. 2005. “Uncertainty and Resistance to Reform in 




Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
B









Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Preplay Communication.” European Journal of Social 
Psychology 18: 125-42. 
 
B
Need Only Not Lose: An Experimental Study of an Asymmetric Participation Game.” 
Journal of Behavioral Decisions Making 18 (April): 111-23. 
 
B
Forecasts.” Public Choice 19 (March): 117-23. 
 
B
Polls.” International Journal of Forecasting 15 (April): 127-35. 
 
C
Quarterly 24 (Fall): 397-418. 
 
C
Economy 107 (December): 1199-217. 
 
C
Model, Uncertainty, and Political Campaigns.” American Politics Quarterly 24: 408-33. 
 
C




Opinion Quarterly 26 (Winter): 578-99. 
 
  26Daudt, Hand. 1961. Floating Voters and the Floating Vote. A Critical Analysis of American 
and English Elections Studies. Leiden: H.E. Stenfert Kroese. 
 
Diermeier, Daniel, and Jan A. Van Mieghem. 2005. “Coordination and Turnout in Large 
Working Paper. 
uffy, John, and Margit Tavits. 2007. “Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal 
rikson, Robert S., and Christopher Wlezien. 1996. “Of Time and Presidential Election 
eddersen, Timothy J., and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 1996. “The Swing Voter’s Curse.” 
eddersen, Timothy J., and Alvaro Sandroni. 2006. “A Theory of Participation in Elections.” 
ey, Mark. 1997. “Stability and Coordination in Duverger’s Law: A Formal Model of 
te Elections: The importance of Polls and 
lections Histories.” Social Choice and Welfare 10 (July): 223-47. 
ide update.” 
roßer, Jens, and Thorsten Giertz. 2006. “Candidates, Voters, and Endogenous Group 
n Exchange and Voter 
articipation: An Experimental Study.” American Political Science Review 100 (May): 235-
su, Li-Chen, and Yusen Sung. 2002. “Experimental Evidence on Voting Rationality and 
Elections.” Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. 
 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. 
 
D
Voter Model.” University of Pittsburgh. Working Paper. 
 
E
Forecasts.” PS: Political Science and Politics 29: 37-9. 
 
F
American Economic Review 86 (June): 408-24. 
 
F
American Economic Review 96 (September): 1271-82. 
 
F
Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting.” American Political Science Review 91 (March): 135-
47. 
 
Forsythe, Robert, Roger B. Myerson, Thomas A. Rietz, and Robert J. Weber. 1993. “An 
Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candida
E
 
Foundation for Information/ESOMAR/WAPOR. 2003. “The freedom to publish opinion poll 
results - Report on a worldw
 
Gärtner, Manfred. 1976. “Endogenous Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in a Rational 
Choice Model.” Public Choice 25 (March): 83-9. 
 
Goeree, Jacob K., and Jens Großer. 2007. “Welfare Reducing Polls.” Economic Theory 31 
(April): 51-68. 
 
Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt. 2005. “An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in 
Models of Political Participation.” American Political Science Review 99 (May): 201-13. 
 
G
Formation: An Experimental Study.” Princeton University. Working Paper. 
 





Decision Framing.” Taiwan Economic Review 30 (June): 247-72. 
 
  27Irwin, G.A., Van Holsteyn, J.J.M. (2000) “Bandwagons, Underdogs, the Titanic, and the Red 
ociation, Quebec, Canada. 
lor, Esteban F., and Eyal Winter. 2007. “On Public Opinion Polls and Voters’ Turnout.” 
ois. Working Paper. 
evine, David K., and Thomas R. Palfrey. 2007. “The Paradox of Voter Participation? A 
art, Arend. 1997. “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma.” 
merican Political Science Review 91 (March): 1-14. 
 Through Costly Political Action.” 
merican Economic Review 84 (June): 518-30. 
ews, and Tadashi Sekiguchi. 2002. Private Strategies in 
initely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring.” Contributions to Theoretical 
atsusaka, John G., and Filip Palda. 1993. „The Downsian Voter Meets the Ecological 
cCarty, Nolan, Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America. The 
ntal Results Based on a Multidimensional Model.” Public Choice 44 
anuary): 61-102. 
eter C. Ordeshook. 1985. “Elections with Limited Information: 
A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as 
Information Sources.” Journal of Economic Theory 36 (June): 55-85. 
 
McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1987. “Elections with Limited Information: 
A Multidimensional Model.” Mathematical Social Science 14 (August): 77-99. 
 
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995). “Quantal Response Equilibria for 
Normal Form Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 10 (July): 6-38. 
Cross: The Influence of Public Opinion Polls on Voters.” Presented at the 18
th World 
Congress of the International Political Science Ass
 
Key, V.O., Jr. 1966. The Responsible Electorate. New York: Vintage. 
 
K
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Working Paper. 
 
Krasa, Stefan, and Mattias Polborn. 2006. “Is Mandatory Voting Better Than Voluntary 
Voting?” University of Illin
 
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1948. The People’s Choice. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Ledyard, John O. 1984. “The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections.” Public 
Choice 44 (January): 7-41. 
 
L





Lohmann, Susanne. 1994. “Information Aggregation
A
 
Malaith, George J., Steven A. Matth
F
Economics 2 (1): Article 2. 
 
M
Fallacy.” Public Choice 77 (December): 855-78. 
 
M
Dance of Ideology and Unequal Rights. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 




McKelvey, Richard D., and P
  28  29
 
Myerson, Roger B. 1998. “Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games.” International 
Journal of Game Theory 27 (November): 375-92. 
 
Myerson, Roger B., and Robert J. Weber. 1993. “A Theory of Voting Equilibria.” American 
Political Science Review 87 (March): 102-14. 
 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal. 1983. “A Strategic Calculus of Voting.” Public 
Choice 41 (January): 7-53. 
 
Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. “Voter Participation and Strategic 
Uncertainty.” American Political Science Review 79 (March): 62-78. 
 
Rapoport, Amnon, and Gary Bornstein. 1989. “Solving Public Good Problems in 
Competition between Equal and Unequal Size Groups.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 
(September): 460-79. 
 
Schram, Arthur, and Joep Sonnemans. 1996a. “Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An 
Experimental Investigation.” International Journal of Game Theory 25 (September): 385-
406. 
 
Schram, Arthur, and Joep Sonnemans. 1996b. “Why People Vote: Experimental Evidence.” 
Journal of Economic Psychology 17 (August): 417-42. 
 
Siegel, Sidney, and N. John Castellan, Jr. 1988. Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral 
sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Simon, Herbert A. 1954. “Bandwagon and Underdog Effects and the Possibility of Elections 
Predictions.” Public Opinion Quarterly 18 (Autumn): 245-53. 
 
Taylor, Curtis, and Huseyin Yildirim. 2006. “Public Information and Electoral Bias.” Duke 
University. Working Paper 
 
Xu, Xiaopeng. 2002. “Voting Costs and Voter Welfare.” Economics Bulletin 3 (21): 1-6  
 
Zaller, John. 2004. “Floating Voters in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1948-2000.” UCLA. 
Working Paper. 
 
Zech, Charles E. 1975. “Leibenstein’s Bandwagon Effect as Applied to Voting.” Public 
Choice 22 (March): 117-22. LabSi Working Papers 
ISSN 1825-8131 (online version) 1825-8123 (print version) 
 
 
Issue Author  Title 
n. 1/2005 
Roberto Galbiati 
Pietro Vertova  
Law and Behaviours in Social Dilemmas: Testing 






Group Cooperation Under Alternative Peer 





Patrizia Sbriglia  
Social Learning in Market Games (June 2005)  
n. 4/2005  Roberto Ricciuti  




Maria Grazia Pazienza  





Arvind Ashta  
The power of words in financial markets:soft versus 
hard communication, a strategy method experiment 
(April 2006)  
n. 7/2006 
Brian Kluger 
Daniel Friedman  
Financial Engineering and Rationality: Experimental 




Vladimira Ilieva  
The dynamics of trader motivations in asset 
bubbles (April 2006)  
n. 9/2006 
Gerlinde Fellner 
Erik Theissen  
Short Sale Constraints, Divergence of Opinion and 






Jürgen von Hagen  
Experimental Evidence on the Benefits of 
Eliminating Exchange Rate Uncertainties and Why 
Expected Utility Theory causes Economists to Miss 
Them (May 2006)  
n. 11/2006 
Niall O'Higgins 
Patrizia Sbriglia  
Are Imitative Strategies Game Specific? 
Experimental Evidence from Market Games 




Roberto Ricciuti  
Drift and Equilibrium Selection with Human and 




Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and 
Experimental Evidence (September 2007)  
n. 14/2007 
Jens Großer 
Arthur Schram  
Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: 





When does a referent problem affect willingness to 
pay for a public good? (September 2007)  
n. 16/2007  Jaromir Kovarik 
Belief Formation and Evolution in Public Good 





Forgive or Buy Back: An Experimental Study of Debt 




School Choice and Information. An Experimental 
Study on Matching Mechanisms (September 2007)  
 LABSI WORKING PAPERS 
ISSN 1825-8131 (ONLINE VERSION) 1825-8123 (PRINT VERSION) 
 
LABSI EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS LABORATORY  
UNIVERSITY OF SIENA 
PIAZZA S. FRANCESCO, 7 53100 SIENA (ITALY) 
http://www.labsi.org    labsi@unisi.it 